Simulatability condition is a fundamental concept in studying key generation over a non-authenticated public channel, in which Eve is active and can intercept, modify and falsify messages exchanged over the non-authenticated public channel. Using this condition, Maurer and Wolf showed a remarkable "all or nothing" result: if the simulatability condition does not hold, the key capacity over the non-authenticated public channel will be the same as that of the case with a passive Eve, while the key capacity over the non-authenticated channel will be zero if the simulatability condition holds. However, two questions remain open so far: 1) For a given joint probability mass function (PMF), are there efficient algorithms (polynomial complexity algorithms) for checking whether the simulatability condition holds or not?; and 2) If the simulatability condition holds, are there efficient algorithms for finding the corresponding attack strategy? In this paper, we answer these two open questions affirmatively. In particular, for a given joint PMF, we construct a linear programming (LP) problem and show that the simulatability condition holds if and only if the optimal value obtained from the constructed LP is zero. Furthermore, we construct another LP and show that the minimizer of the newly constructed LP is a valid attack strategy. Both LPs can be solved with a polynomial complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of secret key generation via public discussion under both source and channel models has attracted significant research interests [1] - [7] . Under the source model, users observe correlated sources generated from a certain joint probability mass function (PMF), and can discuss with each other via a noiseless public channel. Any discussion over the public channel will be overheard by Eve. Furthermore, the public channel can either be authenticated or non-authenticated. An authenticated public channel implies that Eve is a passive listener. On the other hand, a non-authenticated public channel implies that Eve is active and can intercept, modify or falsify any message exchanged through the public channel.
While most of the existing work focused on the key generation with an authenticated public channel, [4] - [7] made significant contributions to the case with a non-authenticated The work of W. Tu and L. Lai was supported by the National Science Foundation CAREER Award under Grant CCF-1318980 and by the National Science Foundation under Grant ECCS-1408114. public channel. In [4] - [7] , Maurer and Wolf introduced a simulatability condition (this condition will be defined precisely in the sequel) and established a remarkable "all or nothing" result. In particular, they showed that for the secret key generation via a non-authenticated public channel with two legitimate terminals in the presence of an active adversary: 1) if the simulatability condition holds, the two legitimate terminals will not be able to establish a secret key, and hence the key capacity is 0; and 2) if the simulatability condition does not hold, the two legitimate terminals can establish a secret key and furthermore the key capacity will be the same as that of the case when Eve is passive.
It is clear that the simulatability condition is a fundamental concept for the key generation via a non-authenticated public channel, and hence it is important to design efficient algorithms to check whether the simulatability condition holds or not. Using ideas from mechanical models, [6] made significant progress in designing efficient algorithms. In particular, [6] proposed to represent PMFs as mass constellations in a coordinate, and showed that the simulatability condition holds if and only if one mass constellation can be transformed into another mass constellation using a finite number of basic mass operations. Furthermore, [6] introduced another notion of one mass constellation being "more centered" than another constellation and designed a low-complexity algorithm to check this "more centered" condition. For some important special cases, which will be described precisely in Section II, [6] showed that the "more centered" condition is necessary and sufficient for the mass constellation transformation problem (and hence is a necessary and sufficient condition for the simulatability condition for these special cases). However, in the general case, the "more centered" condition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the mass constellation transformation problem. Whether there exists efficient algorithms for the mass constellation transformation problem, and hence the simulatability condition, in the general case is still an open question.
As the result, despite the significant progress made in [6] , the following two questions remain open regarding the simulatability condition for the general case: 1) For a given joint PMF, are there efficient algorithms (polynomial complexity algorithms) for checking whether the simulatability condition holds or not? 2) If the simulatability condition holds, are there efficient algorithms for finding the corresponding Eve's attack strategy?
In this paper, we answer these two open questions affirmatively.
To answer the first open question, we construct a linear programming (LP) problem and show that the simulatability condition holds if and only if the optimal value obtained from this LP is zero. We establish our result in three main steps. We first show that, after some basic transformations, checking whether the simulatability condition holds or not is equivalent to checking whether there exists a nonnegative solution to a specially constructed system of linear equations. We then use a basic result from linear algebra to show that whether there exists a nonnegative solution to the constructed system of linear equations is equivalent to whether there is a solution (not necessarily nonnegative) to a related system of inequalities or not. Finally, we use Farkas' lemma [8] , a fundamental result in linear programming and other optimization problems, to show that whether the system of inequalities has a solution or not is equivalent to whether the optimal value of a specially constructed LP is zero or not. Since there exists polynomial complexity algorithms for solving LP problems [9] - [11] , we thus find a polynomial complexity algorithm for checking the simulatability condition for a general PMF.
To answer the second open question, we construct another LP and show that the minimizer of this LP is a valid attack strategy. The proposed approach is very flexible in the sense that one can simply modify the cost function of the constructed LP to obtain different attack strategies. Furthermore, the cost function can be modified to satisfy various design criteria. For example, a simple cost function can be constructed to minimize the amount of modifications Eve needs to perform during the attack. All these optimization problems with different cost functions can be solved with a polynomial complexity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce some preliminaries and the problem setup. In Section III, we present our main results. In Section IV, we use a numerical example to illustrate the proposed algorithm. In Section V, we offer our concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM SETUP
Let X = {1, · · · , |X |}, Y = {1, · · · , |Y|} and Z = {1, · · · , |Z|} be three finite sets. Consider three correlated random variables (X, Y, Z), taking values from X × Y × Z, with joint PMF P XY Z , the simulatability condition is defined as follows:
) For a given P XY Z , we say X is simulatable by Z with respect to Y , denoted by Sim Y (Z → X), if there exists a conditional PMF PX |Z such that P YX = P Y X , with
in which P Y X and P Y Z are the joint PMFs of (Y, X) and (Y, Z) under P XY Z respectively.
One can also define Sim X (Z → Y ) in the same manner. This concept of simulatability, first defined in [4] , is a fundamental concept in the problem of secret key generation over a non-authenticated public channel [5] - [7] , in which two terminals Alice and Bob would like to establish a secret key in the presence of an adversary Eve. These three terminals observe sequences X N , Y N and Z N generated according to
Alice and Bob can discuss with each other via a public nonauthenticated noiseless channel, which means that Eve not only has full access to the channel but can also interrupt, modify and falsify messages exchanged over this public channel.
The largest key rate that Alice and Bob can generate with the presence of the active attacker is denoted as S * (X; Y ||Z) [5] . Let S(X; Y ||Z) denote the largest key rate that Alice and Bob can generate when Eve is passive, i.e., when the public channel is authenticated. Clearly, S(X; Y ||Z) ≥ S * (X; Y ||Z).
Although a full characterization of S(X; Y ||Z) is unknown in general, [5] established the following remarkable "all or nothing" result:
This significant result implies that, if the simulatability condition does not hold, one can generate a key with the same rate as if Eve were passive. On the other hand, if the simulatability condition holds, the key rate will be zero. Intuitively speaking, if Sim Y (Z → X) holds, then after observing Z N , Eve can generateX N by passing Z N through a channel defined by PX |Z . Then (X N , Y N ) has the same statistics as (X N , Y N ). Hence by knowing only Y N , Bob cannot distinguishX N and X N , and hence cannot distinguish Alice or Eve.
As mentioned in the introduction, [6] has made important progress in developing low-complexity algorithms for checking whether Sim Y (Z → X) (or Sim X (Z → Y )) holds or not. In particular, [6] developed an efficient algorithm to check a related condition called "more centered" condition. When |Y| = 2, that is when Y is a binary random variable, this "more centered" condition is shown to be necessary and sufficient for Sim Y (Z → X). Hence, [6] has found an efficient algorithm to check Sim Y (Z → X) for the special case of Y being binary (the algorithm is also effective in checking Sim X (Z → Y ) when X is binary). However, when Y is not binary, the "more centered" condition is only a necessary condition for Sim Y (Z → X). Hence, two questions remain open: 1) For a general given P XY Z , are there efficient algorithms (polynomial complexity algorithms) for checking whether Sim Y (Z → X) (or Sim X (Z → Y )) holds or not?
2) If Sim Y (Z → X) (or Sim X (Z → Y )) holds, are there efficient algorithms for finding the corresponding PX |Z (or PȲ |Z )?
Notation: Throughout this paper, we use boldface uppercase letters to denote matrices, boldface lowercase letters to denote vectors. We also use 1, 0 and I, unless stated otherwise, to denote all ones column vector, all zeros column vector and the identity matrix, respectively. In addition, we denote the vectorization of a matrix by Vec(·). Specifically, for an m × n matrix A, Vec(A) is an mn × 1 column vector: 11 , · · · , a m1 , · · · , a 1n , · · · , a mn ] T ,
in which [·] T is the transpose of the matrix. And vice versa can be done by A =Reshape(Vec(A), [m, n]). We use A ⊗ B to denote the Kronecker product of matrices A and B. Specifically, assume A is an m × n matrix, then
All matrices and vectors in this paper are real.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this paper, we focus on Sim Y (Z → X). The developed algorithm can be easily modified to check Sim X (Z → Y ). We rewrite (1) in the following matrix form
Checking whether Sim Y (Z → X) holds or not is equivalent to checking whether there exists a transition matrix Q such that (5) holds. As Q is a transition matrix, its entries q kj s must satisfy
We note that if q kj s satisfy (6) and (7), they will automatically satisfy q kj ≤ 1. Hence, we don't need to state this requirement here.
If there exists at least one transition matrix Q satisfying (5), (6) and (7) simultaneously, we can conclude that the simulatability condition Sim Y (Z → X) holds. (7) can be written in the matrix form
Then, (5) and (8) can be written in the following compact form:
in which the sizes for I, 1 and 0 are |X | × |X |, 1 × |X | and 1 × |X |, respectively. For notational convenience, we define
From (9), it is clear that c is an m × 1 vector, A is an m × n matrix, and q is an n × 1 vector, in which m = |Y||X | + |Z|, n = |Z||X |.
With these notation and combining (9) with (6), the original problem of checking whether Sim Y (Z → X) holds or not is equivalent to checking whether there exists nonnegative solutions q for the system
In the following, we check whether there exists at least a nonnegative solution for the system defined by (12) . There are two main steps: 1) whether the system is consistent or not; 2) if it is consistent, whether there exists a nonnegative solution or not. Checking the consistency of (12) is straightforward: a necessary and sufficient condition for a system of nonhomogenous linear equations to be consistent is
where (A|c) is the augmented matrix of A. If (13) is not satisfied, it can be concluded that Sim Y (Z → X) does not hold. If (13) is satisfied, we need to further check whether there exists a nonnegative solution to (12) or not.
To proceed further, we will need the following definition of generalized inverse (g-inverse) of a matrix G.
Definition 2. ( [12]
) For a given m × n real matrix G, an n × m real matrix G g is called a g-inverse of G if
The g-inverse G g is generally not unique (If n = m and G is full rank, then G g is unique and equal to the inverse matrix G −1 ). A particular choice of g-inverse is called the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse G + , which can be computed using multiple different approaches. One approach is to use the singular value decomposition (SVD): by SVD, for a given G and its SVD decomposition G = UΣV T , then, G + can be obtained as G + = VΣ + U T , in which Σ + is obtained by taking the reciprocal of each non-zero element on the diagonal of the diagonal matrix Σ, leaving the zeros in place. One can easily check that the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse G + obtained by SVD satisfies the g-inverse matrix definition and hence is a valid g-inverse.
With the concept of g-inverse, we are ready to state our main result regarding the first open question. Theorem 2. Let A g be any given g-inverse of A (e.g., it can be chosen as the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse A + ), and h * be obtained by the following LP
Then Sim Y (Z → X) holds, if and only if h * = 0 and (13) holds.
Proof. If (13) does not hold, then there is no solution to (12) , and hence Sim Y (Z → X) does not hold.
In the remainder of the proof, we assume that (13) holds. If (13) holds, the general solution to (12) can be written in the following form (see, e.g., Theorem 2 a.(d) of [12] )
in which A g can be any given g-inverse of A, and p is an arbitrary length-n vector.
As the result, the problem of whether there exists a nonnegative solution to (12) (i.e., q 0) is equivalent to the problem of whether there exists a solution p for the following system defined by
To check whether the system defined by (16) has a solution, we use Farkas' lemma, a fundamental lemma in linear programming and related area in optimization. For completeness, we state the form of Farkas' lemma used in our proof in Appendix A. To use Farkas' lemma, we first write a LP related to the system defined in (16)
The above LP is always feasible since t = 0 is a vector that satisfies the constraints, which results in t T A g c = 0. Hence the optimal value h * ≤ 0. Using Farkas' lemma, we have that (16) has a solution if and if h * = 0. More specifically, if h * = 0, then there exists at least a solution p for (16), which further implies that there is a nonnegative solution to (12) , and hence Sim Y (Z → X) holds. On the other hand, if h * < 0, then there is no solution p for (16), which further implies that there is no nonnegative solution to (12) , and hence Sim Y (Z → X) does not hold.
As mentioned above, if Rank(A) = m = n holds, then A g = A −1 is unique. For other cases, A g might not be unique. We have the following proposition asserting that different choices of A g will not affect the result in Theorem 2. Proposition 1. Different choices of A g will not affect the result on whether h * equals 0 or not.
Due to the page limitation, we omit the details of this proof, which can be found in [13] .
Remark 1. The proposed algorithm for checking whether Sim Y (Z → X) holds or not has a polynomial complexity. Among all operations required, computing the g-inverse and solving the LP defined by (14) require most computations. The complexity to obtain A g is of order O(n 3 ) [14] . Furthermore, there exists polynomial complexity algorithms to solve the LP defined by (14) . For example, [10] provided an algorithm to solve LP using O(n 3 L) operations, where L is number of binary bits needed to store input data of the problem (one can refer to Chapter 8 in [11] for more details about the complexity of algorithms for solving LP). Hence, the total operations of our algorithm for checking Sim Y (Z → X) is of order O(n 3 L).
Thus, we can conclude that the proposed algorithm can check whether Sim Y (Z → X) holds or not with a polynomial complexity. In the following, we provide our answer to the second open question, i.e., if Sim Y (Z → X) holds, how to find PX |Z efficiently. Theorem 3. Let e be any n × 1 vector with e 0, and q * be the obtained from the following LP:
If Sim Y (Z → X) holds, then Q * = Reshape(q * , [|X |, |Z|]) T is a valid choice for PX |Z .
Proof. By assumption, Sim Y (Z → X) holds, which implies that the system defined by (12) is consistent and it has nonnegative solutions. Hence, the following LP is feasible
where e 0. Hence, the minimizer q * is nonnegative and satisfies Aq * = c. We can then reshape q * into matrix Q * (the reverse operation of (10)). Q * is a valid choice for PX |Z . Remark 2. Since finding a suitable PX |Z using our approach is equivalent to solving a LP, the complexity is of polynomial order.
Remark 3. For a given distribution P XY Z , there may be more than one possible PX |Z such that (1) holds. Different choices of e in (17) give different values for PX |Z . In addition, the objective function f (q) can be further modified to satisfy various design criteria of Eve. For example, letq = Vec(Q[q kj ] T ) with q kj = P X|Z (k|j), then setting f (q) = ||q −q|| 2 2 will minimize the amount of changes in the conditional PMF in the l 2 norm sense. This is a quadratic programming, which can still be solved efficiently.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we provide an example to illustrate the proposed algorithm. To better compare our proposed algorithm with the method in [6] , we use one of examples in [6] as the example.
Example: Let P XY Z with ranges X = {x 1 , x 2 }, Y = {y 1 , y 2 } and Z = {z 1 , z 2 , z 3 } be: P XY Z (x 1 , y 1 , z 1 ) = 6/100, P XY Z (x 2 , y 1 , z 1 ) = 4/100, P XY Z (x 1 , y 1 , z 2 ) = 9/100, P XY Z (x 2 , y 1 , z 2 ) = 6/100, P XY Z (x 1 , y 1 , z 3 ) = 15/100, P XY Z (x 2 , y 1 , z 3 ) = 10/100, P XY Z (x 1 , y 2 , z 1 ) = 36/100, P XY Z (x 2 , y 2 , z 1 ) = 4/100, P XY Z (x 1 , y 2 , z 2 ) = 9/100, P XY Z (x 2 , y 2 , z 2 ) = 1/100,
To use our algorithm, we have the following steps:
Step 1: Compute P Y Z and P Y X , and write them in the matrix form A and C:
Step 2: Construct A and c using (10): 
Step 3: Check the ranks of A and (A|c): Rank(A) = Rank((A|c)) = 5.
Step 4: Choose the g-inverse to be the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse A + and calculate A + c and I − A + A: Step 5: Solve LP (14) . Using the above data, we obtain h * = 0, which implies that Sim Y (Z → X) holds. We note that our proposed algorithm works with distributions with larger alphabet sizes, while the method proposed in [6] loses its efficiency in these cases.
V. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have proposed an efficient algorithm to check the simulatability condition, an important condition in studying secret key generation using a non-authenticated public channel. We have also proposed a simple and flexible method to calculate a possible simulatability channel if the simulatability condition holds. The proposed algorithms have polynomial complexities.
APPENDIX A FARKAS' LEMMA
There are several equivalent forms of the Farkas' lemma [8] . Here, we state a form that will be used in our proof. 
